Job search models typically describe jobs in terms of wages without accounting for other characteristics, but empirical evidence suggests non-wage characteristics are an important determinant of job choice. For instance, workers in the NLSY79 report moving from a higher paying job to a lower paying job in 33% of voluntary job-tojob transitions. I estimate an equilibrium-based job search model that accounts for hiring wages, on-the-job wage growth, non-wage job characteristics, and measurement error. This model provides the rst known estimate of the cumulative importance of all non-wage characteristics in job market decisions. I nd that variation across jobs in non-wage characteristics is roughly twice as important as variation in hiring wages. I use the model and estimated parameters to measure how workers value the better non-wage characteristics and on-the-job wage growth potential that result when unemployment insurance enables them to search longer. Accounting for these previously unmeasured benets more than triples my estimate of the program's value to workers.
Introduction
Job search models typically describe jobs in terms of wages without accounting for other characteristics, but empirical evidence suggests that workers also care about other job characteristics. We see the importance of non-wage characteristics in the NLSY79, where workers 1 move to a lower paying job in 33% of voluntary job transitions without an intervening unemployment spell. Workers reject their highest wage oer in 24% of the unemployment spells for which we observe multiple wage oers. The survey asks workers why they rejected the oer, and the answers emphasize the importance of location, scheduling, appropriate use of the worker's skills and a supportive workplace environment. This paper answers the question, How important are non-wage characteristics and variation in on-the-job wage growth to labor market behavior? I use these results to show that non-wage characteristics have important welfare implications in an application to unemployment insurance (UI). This paper extends both the compensating dierential and job search literatures. The compensating dierential literature uses the relationship between wages and observed job characteristics to estimate how workers value these non-wage characteristics. A smaller literature extends this hedonic approach to job-search models. By accounting for all nonwage characteristics, this paper oers a more general search model and a more complete accounting of the value workers receive when UI facilitates better matching. Section 2 discusses the relevant compensating dierential and job search literatures in greater detail before introducing the UI literature related to my policy analysis.
Section 3 describes the NLSY79 data used in this paper and provides statistical evidence that observed job choices are inconsistent with static wage maximization. This statistical evidence is based on a subset of the data used to estimate the structural search model. Specifically, it focuses on`voluntary switches.' Voluntary switches are dened as job transitions in which a worker quits his current job and begins a new job without an intervening unemployment spell. Voluntary switches are especially informative because the worker's choice reveals his preference for the new job without relying on any assumptions about search behavior, wage formation or the form of the utility function. While the purely statistical approach indicates that workers consider factors other than wages when choosing jobs, structural assumptions are necessary to estimate the economic importance of non-wage characteristics in job market decisions.
2 Section 4 presents a static discrete choice model of job choice in which workers get utility from both wages and other job characteristics. The static model demonstrates the intuition behind the more complete search model in a comparatively simple environment. I estimate the static model using voluntary job switches. This model uses the bare minimum of economic structure necessary to estimate the variance of utility from non-wage job characteristics across a worker's job oers. However, the static model does not account for measurement error in wages, strategic wage oer formation or variation in on-the-job wage growth potential.
Section 5 presents the search model that addresses the major shortcomings of the static model. The wage bargaining environment in this model follows Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) in allowing variation in on-the-job wage growth potential to aect job choice. I add a richer specication for worker productivity and a separate match quality capturing worker utility from non-wage job characteristics. Section 6 discusses identication and computational issues related to estimation. Measurement error is a central concern because it obscures the relationship between wages and job choice. I model measurement error using an unobserved heterogeneity specication which estimates the distribution of the true wage given the observed wage.
A number of empirical issues arise from changes in the NLSY79 survey content over time.
For instance, rejected wage oer data is subject to dierent selection rules because the survey questions dier from year to year. I explicitly model the selection rules for each set of survey questions. The survey asks about specic non-wage job characteristics from 1994-2004. I use this data with my estimates of utility from non-wage sources to determine how workers value specic observable job characteristics.
Section 7 presents the results and applies them to simulate the impact of UI on hiring wages, on-the-job wage growth and non-wage characteristics following unemployment spells. Meyer (1990) shows that, by subsidizing search, UI causes workers to remain unemployed for longer. My estimates of the impact of UI on hiring wages are similar to other estimates in this literature, but accounting for non-wage characteristics and on-the-job wage growth more than triples the estimated value of the improved matches facilitated by UI. I also show that the implied utility from observed job characteristics such as health insurance and paid sick leave generally have the expected sign and reasonable magnitudes. Section 8 concludes, and I suggest that the results in this paper motivate a careful accounting of non-wage characteristics in a broad range of policy analyses.
Literature Review
Compensating dierentials were rst discussed by Adam Smith, and modern empirical analysis of the subject begins with Thaler and Rosen (1975) . Thaler and Rosen estimate the implied value of a life from a regression of wages on job riskiness and control variables .
Other researchers use similar empirical strategies to estimate compensating dierentials for heavy workload, undesirable work hours and a variety of other job characteristics.
This literature generally assumes perfect matching with no informational frictions. Hwang, Mortensen and Reed (1998) show that if informational frictions exist, these models underestimate workers' willingness to pay for job characteristics, and Lang and Majumdar (2003) show they may even produce estimates with the wrong sign. Models without search frictions are also inappropriate to evaluate programs that aect matching such as UI.
A smaller literature uses job search models to account for informational frictions when estimating the value of non-wage job characteristics. Blau (1991) , Gorgens (2002) and Bloemen (2008) use search models to estimate workers' preferences over the number of hours worked. Van den berg (1992) estimates a search model that includes moving costs between jobs that vary with occupation and certain fringe benets. Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Sullivan (2008) estimate preferences over broad occupational categories in a search model with endogenous human capital accumulation.
The research dierentiating part-time from full-time work suggests that preference het-4 erogeneity is important. Job oers in these model include both a wage and a number of work hours per week. Blau (1991) imposes homogeneous preferences and nds no systematic preference over hours worked at any given hourly wage. Gorgens (2002) allows for heterogeneous preferences over hours worked, and he nds that a worker's reservation wage for full time work can vary from 31% more to 16% less than his reservation wage for part time work.
Bloemen (2008) also allows for heterogeneous preferences in hours workers, and he nds that Unemployment Insurance signicantly improves matches for hours worked.
Keane and Wolpin estimate homogeneous non-pecuniary utility from schooling, military service, home production, blue collar work and white collar work as controls while addressing questions of human capital accumulation. This model captures human capital investment and occupation choice, though it does not distinguish between jobs within a broad occupational category. Sullivan (2008) extends this framework to allow more occupation categories, heterogeneous preferences over occupations and rm specic human capital.
The common approach throughout the existing research focuses on observable job characteristics. This approach provides concrete interpretations of how workers value specic characteristics. I sacrice the direct identication of compensating dierentials for specic characteristics by combining all non-wage characteristics in a search model. This allows a more general search model and a more complete accounting of the benets from improved matches due to UI.
I account for wage dynamics in a similar manner to Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) . A worker in the Postel-Vinay and Robin model has dierent productivities at dierent rms.
He may accept a wage below his rm-specic marginal product, but this wage at this rm increases as the rm competes with outside oers for the worker's services. Because a worker's wage with a rm is limited by his marginal product at the rm, he may accept a lower initial wage to work for a higher productivity rm. This endogenously explains voluntary transitions to lower paying jobs. Connelly and Gottschalk (2004) estimate that roughly a third of job changes by low-skilled workers involving immediate wage decreases are undertaken for higher expected future wages, and they attribute the remaining job changes to non-economic reasons. These non-economic reasons correspond to the demand for various non-wage job characteristics. Lopes de Melo (2007) undertakes a similar analysis and nds that wage dynamics explain transitions to lower paying jobs well for high-wage workers, but they do not explain voluntary transitions to lower paying jobs for low-wage workers.
The American UI system has been one of the most popular research subjects among labor economists over the last 30 years. UI subsidizes periods of job search by providing payments to laid o workers until they nd a new job. This job search subsidy encourages workers to be more selective in which jobs they accept, and workers receiving generous UI benets typically remain unemployed and search for longer than those receiving less generous UI benets (Meyer, 1990) . Existing measurements of the benets from this induced search have had mixed and sometimes puzzling results. Early research such as Ehrenberg and Oaxaca(1976) nds this extended search increases hiring wages following unemployment spells, but later research such as Addison and Blackburn (2000) concludes that program generosity has no measurable impact on post-unemployment wages. Centeno (2004) nds that UI program generosity causes longer lasting job matches following unemployment spells, and he argues that these longer job tenures are evidence that UI improves matches. Taken together, these ndings suggest the American UI program improves matches in a way that is not captured by wages. However, Card, Chetty and Weber (2007) uses a discontinuity in eligibility for the Austrian UI program to show Austrian UI extends job-search without increasing post-unemployment wage or tenure. The NLSY79 reports 4505 spells during which a worker holds multiple jobs, but the 1 Attrition will not bias the results presented in this paper if it is uncorrelated with job market choices. 7 employment histories I construct limit workers to one job at a time. A worker holding multiple jobs is listed as continuing the job he started rst. If the worker starts multiple jobs in the same month, the employment history retains only the job the worker holds for the longest time. If a worker has multiple jobs with the same start and end months, the employment history records the job in which he works the most hours. Table 2 Table 3 , workers move from a higher paying job to a lower paying job in a third of voluntary switches. This pattern is common to both low-wage and high-wage workers.
Rejected job oer data is available during 1,831 unemployment spells occurring in 1981, 1982, 1986, 1987, 1994 
where w ij is the hourly wage associated with job j and d ij is utility from non-wage characteristics of job j. Utility from non-wage characteristics is distributed For each voluntary job switch, the principle of revealed preference guarantees that utility from the new job is greater than the utility from the old job. If a worker moved from an old job paying $10/hr to a new job paying $7/hr, then the non-wage characteristics associated with the new job must be worth at least $3/hr more than the non-wage characteristics of the old job. The value of d ij plays a similar role to the residual in standard discrete choice models, but the residual has a concrete economic interpretation and important welfare implications in this model.
The likelihood function is
where S is the set of voluntary job switches, w sn is the wage at the new employer and w so is the wage at the old employer.
The simple model estimates the standard deviation of non-wage utility among a worker's oers is $20.54/hr, while the standard deviation of wages among a worker's oers is $5.67/hr.
These results should be viewed with skepticism because this model ignores numerous confounding issues for expositional simplicity. These issues are addressed in the search model. 5 The Search Model
The Environment
Workers solve an innite-horizon 4 dynamic programming problem when deciding which job oers to accept and when to quit a job. A rm solves a dynamic programming problem in forming wage oers to its potential workers.
Each period is comprised of four stages:
4 Estimation requires an innite horizon model for computational tractability because employment histories include 22 years of data in 1-month periods. Workers in the data are generally far from retirement, and a terminal condition would be unlikely to dramatically aect worker or rm behavior. A match between worker i and rm j is described by four characteristics in each period t.
The worker's general human capital y it is a measure of his average productivity across jobs.
The match quality reecting production m ijt measures how well the worker's skills match the demands of the job. For example, an expert cabinet maker may have a high m ijt at a rm that installs cabinets and a lower m ijt at a job doing general carpentry.
Non-wage utility d ijt captures the value of characteristics of a job such as geographic location, camaraderie with coworkers, health care provision, etc. A job pays an hourly wage w ijt . The rm's prot from a relationship with a worker is
The worker's utility from working at rm j is
and the worker's utility from being unemployed is
where l it is unemployment spell length and b it is the unemployment insurance benet. it is person-and period-specic utility of unemployment due to unobserved factors. Intuition suggests γ 1 is negative because per period utility decreases as a worker depletes his savings. given the rm's optimal choices. Because non-wage characteristics may be costly to provide, a worker's marginal product y it m ijt is interpreted as his impact on rm prot after accounting for all costs except his wage.
The rst step in each period is match formation. Unemployed workers have a probability λ u of being matched with a new employer, and employed workers have a probability λ e of being matched with a new employer. Workers are matched with at most one new employer in a period.
In the second step, the variables y it , m ijt and d ijt evolve according to the process
Initial draws of m ijt and d ijt for new matches are drawn from
The mean of the initial distribution is normalized for identication.
In the third step, rms observe all match characteristics and form wage oers. Wage contracts follow Postel-Vinay and Turon (2006) in applying a mutual consent renegotiation clause. Mutual consent renegotiation stipulates that a rm needs a worker's consent to lower his wages.
6 A layo occurs if the rm refuses to pay the current wage and the worker refuses a wage cut. A worker may consent to a wage cut if he wishes to keep his job and the rm has a credible threat of a layo at the previous wage.
If only one rm is matched to a worker, the rm makes a take-it-or-leave-it wage oer to the worker. If two rms are matched with a worker, they form wage oers to the worker in an environment where both rms see all characteristics of both matches. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium wage oer strategy is described in the next section.
The last event in each period is the worker's decision to accept or reject any wage oers he receives.
Value Functions and Equilibrium Behavior
The last choice in each period is the worker's job acceptance decision. The worker has the choice to be unemployed for the period and may have up to two job oers to consider. Letting V n denote the value of having n job oers, j be denote a new match and t = t + 1, the worker's value functions are
6 Malcomson (1999) argues that mutual consent renegotiation is consistent with important legal and empirical facts about the US labor market.
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I dene a protable wage oer as an oer that yields a positive expected present value of prots if accepted. The constraint on w ijt states that the rm cannot lower the worker's wage if the previous wage is protable. This follows from mutual consent renegotiation because the worker will not renegotiate if the previous wage is protable.
A layo 7 occurs if the wage from the previous period is unprotable and there is no w ijt such that both the worker and rm value functions are strictly positive. Thus b it = 1 if V f (w ij,t−1 , :) < 0 because the worker is eligible for UI payments if he does not accept a pay cut.
For a set of environment parameters {α, Ω,
an equilibrium is a wage oer function W for rms and a job-choice function A for workers such such that A maximizes each worker's present value of expected utility and W maximizes each rm's present value of expected prots.
The equilibrium considered in this paper employs a weakly dominant wage oer strategy in the perfect information environment. A rm that is matched to a worker but does not employ him using this strategy would earn negative expected prots if it increased its wage oer enough to hire him. Each accepted wage oer is the lowest wage that is both acceptable to the worker and consistent with mutual consent renegotiation.
This strategy is dened as follows: a rm oers any worker who was unemployed in the previous period the lowest wage that the worker will accept if this wage is protable.
Otherwise the rm oers the highest protable wage, and the worker rejects this oer. A rm in a continuing match with a worker will follow the same strategy subject to mutual consent renegotiation. Firms may decrease a worker's wage if the wage from the previous period is no longer protable. Specically, the worker may consent to a wage cut to the greatest protable wage.
To describe the strategies of two rms competing for a worker, I arbitrarily order the rms 1 and 2. Let A 1 and A 2 denote a worker's value of accepting the respective rms' greatest protable wage oers. The value to the worker of rejecting both oers and becoming To infer the distribution of these match characteristics, I discuss the implications of each match characteristic on observable outcomes. In general, human capital y it is directly associated with wage levels across jobs, match quality aecting production m ijt is directly 8 Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) show that a worker's reservation wage is inversely related to job-specic productivity because his wage growth potential is greatest at jobs where he is most productive.
associated with job tenure and on-the-job wage growth, and non-wage utility d ijt is directly associated with a willingness to enter and continue a match with lower wages than outside oers. However inference about these characteristics is complicated by their overlapping eects on job choices and wage oers. 
Measurement Error
Measurement error is an important concern because it obscures the relationship between wages and job choice. I account for measurement error using an unobserved heterogeneity specication. I estimate the distribution of each true wage from the observed wage and a 9 Controlling for selection into long spells is inherent in the model's structure.
classical measurement error assumption.
I estimate the structural model under three assumptions about the amount of measurement error. I rst estimate the structural model assuming 18% of cross-sectional variation in wages is due to measurement error. This comes from Bound and Krueger (1991), which compares earnings data from the CPS and from payroll tax records. Treating tax data as true income, they nd that 82% of cross-sectional variation in mens' measured earnings is due to true variation.
Because the Bound and Krueger estimate considers annual earnings, measurement error in hourly wages may be signicantly more (or less) than 18%. I conduct sensitivity analysis by estimating the structural model under the assumptions that measurement error accounts for 0% and 30% of cross sectional variation in wages.
Grouping of UI Parameters
To simplify computation, I group states with similar UI parameters together and model them with a representative UI benet formula. This allows me to treat UI group as a discrete state variable. Workers in states that have signicantly changed their benets formulas since 1979 are assigned to the UI group that most closely matches the state's policy during each employment or unemployment spell. Table 7 describes characteristics of each UI benet group.
Rejected Oers
Rejected wage oer data is subject to diering selection rules in dierent years. In some years, 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
The empirical model progresses in discrete one-month periods. The match probabilities λ e and λ u are calculated as the mean number of oers per month that workers receive while employed and unemployed respectively during years when the survey includes this data. All other parameters are estimated using maximum likelihood estimation.
To generate the transition matrix for a given set of environmental parameters, I solve the worker's and rm's problems using successive iterations of a 4-step process. These four steps are The rst step in this process calculates the rm's value function using the identity
where π is a vector of per-period prots for each set of match characteristics, and P f is the current estimate of the matrix of probabilities that a worker both remains at his current job transitions between the specied match characteristics. Solving for V f yields
Next I update the wage oer function using the wage oer strategy described in the previous section and the current estimates of the value functions.
In the third step, I solve for transition probabilities between jobs. New match formation and the distribution of shocks to y it , m ijt and d ijt for existing jobs are specied by environmental parameters, and the associated wage oers w ijt are specied by the current estimate of the wage oer function. Job choices for workers choosing between two matches are determined by the current estimate of the worker's value function.
The fourth step is updating the worker's value function given the current estimated transition probabilities. This step uses the identity
where u is the worker's per-period utility and P w is the worker's transition probability matrix.
Solving for V w yields
The xed point of this process is an equilibrium. 
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If wage data during spells were not available, the state distribution for a worker after
where L i1 is the employment spell length. To calculate the probability that this spell is followed by a switch to a new employer lasting L i2 periods, the previous distribution is multiplied by T 2 T
Continuing in this manner through an employment history yields an expression for a vector whose sum is the probability of the observed series of spell types and lengths.
To incorporate the observed wage, spell termination type, UI takeup and rejected wage oer data, I introduce`lters'. Filters impose that the state at any time t is consistent with the data observed for that time. If a worker quit his job and becomes unemployed, the appropriate lter has a value of 1 for states corresponding to unemployment following a quit and a value of 0 for all other states. I apply the lter by taking the Hadamard product of the state vector in that period with the lter.
11
10 Each transition matrix assigns probability 0 to transitions that are inconsistent with the stated usage of that matrix. For instance, the unemployment-to-unemployment matrix T 3 assigns 0 probability to transitions that either start or end in employment. Thus many columns in these matrices sum to 0, and even those rows consistent with the starting condition of a matrix condition generally sum to less than 1.
11 The Hadamard product of two vectors A and B, denoted A • B, is a vector such that (A • B) j = a j b j
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The most frequently used lters are associated with observed wages. The value of this lter for state s is the probability of observing the wage w ijt when the wage associated with s is the true wage. Filters associated with rejected wage oers add the requirements specied in the rejected wages section.
As an example of lter usage, the state vector in the initial period then the initial state vector is C i0 • F i0 . If wages are observed again after three months at the same job, the state vector is (C i0 • F i0 )T 
The contribution of match productivity is calculated as
The value contribution of wages is The data used in this regression include annual observations from 1994 to 2004 for each worker. Spells terminating before 1994 are excluded due to lack of job characteristics data.
7 Results Table 8 presents parameter estimates from the search model. I discuss ve conclusions based on these parameter estimates and related simulations:
1. Non-wage characteristics are a far more important margin of job choice than wage level.
Productivity, the source of job security and on-the-job wage growth, is of roughly equal importance to wage level.
2. Wages have moderately declining marginal utility, and high wages workers are more likely to sacrice any xed wage amount for improved non-wage characteristics than low wage workers.
3. Productive match quality m ijt and utility from non-wage characteristics d ijt are subject to signicant shocks, but neither experiences a signicant trend.
4. The mean impact of UI on hiring wage following an unemployment spell is $0.11/hr in states with the least generous UI benets and $0.17/hr in states with the most generous UI benets. This impact on wages is only a small part of the total benet workers receive from improved post-unemployment matches. 12 Given that the marginal utility of wages is less than 1 unit per dollar, non-wage characteristics are a much more important determinant of job choice than wages. The estimate of √ Ω dd decreases to 11.08 in the specication that assumes high measurement error, and it increases to 14.02 in the specication that assumes wages are measured without error.
Dierences between specications occur because a specication that assumes less measurement error will interpret choices to accept lower paying oers as evidence of non-wage characteristics instead of an artifact of measurement error. The estimated importance of non-wage characteristics is relatively stable across specications given the large dierences in assumptions about measurement error. The exponent on wages in the utility function is approximately 0.9 in all three specications. This implies that high wage workers are more willing to sacrice a xed wage amount for improved non-wage characteristics than low wage workers. However the declining marginal utility of wages is oset by larger wage dierentials across jobs for high-wage workers, and human capital y it has no systematic eect on the likelihood of voluntary switches with wage cuts.
Productive match-quality m ijt and match-specic utility from non-wage characteristics d ijt are both subject to signicant shocks each period. The variance σ 2 m of shocks to productive match quality is 0.05, which is 5% of the mean productivity at a new potential match.
The variance σ 2 d of shocks to utility from non-wage characteristics is 3.265. The estimates of the mean shocks to these match characteristics are both small (µ m = .002 and µ d = −0.014),
suggesting that the trend of increasing job stability over a worker's career is due to selection into better matches rather than the accumulation of match-specic human capital or improvements in non-wage characteristics during an individual employment spell.
Simulations show that UI recipiency is associated with longer unemployment spells and improved matches following unemployment spells. Table 8 shows that, in the primary specication, UI recipiency increases hiring wages upon re-employment by $0.11/hr in states with the least generous benets and $0.17 in states with the most generous benets. Benets in the most generous states can be more than twice as large as benets in the least generous states, so UI benet payments have a declining marginal impact on re-employment wages.
However the total benet of better post-unemployment matches due to UI is over three times as important as the wage dierential. Much of this is due to the impact on non-wage characteristics, which is roughly 1.5 times as valuable as the impact on wages. Table 9 shows that the program's impact on post-unemployment wages is stable across specications, and Table 10 shows the relative importance of productivity and non-wage characteristics varies only moderately across specications. Between 23% and 29% of the value of improved reemployment outcomes is due to improved productivity, and between 38% and 50% is due to improved non-wage characteristics.
The treatment of UI takeup as exogenous may be a concern in this UI application. If expectations about unemployment spell length aect takeup, the estimated eect of the program on post-unemployment outcomes is subject to endogeneity bias. However, most transitions in the data occur when a worker is ineligible for UI, and estimates of the relative importance of wages, productivity and non-wage characteristics are less subject to this bias.
As a result, the relative importance of these three margins in the UI application is unlikely to be dramatically aected by assumptions about UI takeup.
Finally, I simulate non-wage utility d ijt and regress changes in d ijt on changes in observed non-wage characteristics. This regression is intended as a check of the model rather than an estimate of true parameters because observed non-wage characteristics are probably correlated to the unobserved characteristics constituting the residual. Nevertheless, the estimates in Table 11 tively important to workers, and an extra day per year of paid leave is half as valuable as the provision of life insurance. Working for a large rm, as proxied by the number of workers on site, negatively aects non-wage utility. The value of paternity leave is estimated to be negative, but it is neither statistically nor economically dierent from 0.
The relatively low R 2 in this regression suggests that job preferences are determined largely by unobserved characteristics.
Conclusion
Employed workers frequently quit higher paying jobs in favor lower paying jobs, and unemployed workers frequently reject their highest wage oer in order to accept a lower wage oer. These facts indicate that static wage maximization is a poor approximation of worker behavior. To the extent that workers value job security, potential for future wage growth, health insurance provision, camaraderie with coworkers and a multitude of other job characteristics, it is important to account for these characteristics when analyzing labor market policy such as unemployment insurance.
This paper estimates an equilibrium based job search model to determine the relative importance of these factors. I nd that match-specic productivity, which determines job security and on-the-job wage growth, is as important a determinant of job choice as hiring wages, and non-wage characteristics are roughly twice as important to workers as hiring wages. These ndings are relatively robust to varying assumptions about measurement error.
I apply the estimated model ndings to simulate the value to workers from the improved employment outcomes that result when UI facilitates extended job search. I nd that UI increases re-employment wages by 11 to 17 cents per hours, which is of similar magnitude to Addison and Blackburn. However, the total benet to workers is more than three times the wage benet. This result underscores the importance of accounting for wage dynamics 29 and non-wage characteristics when evaluating public policies.
Regressing changes in non-wage utility on changes in job characteristics, I nd that health insurance, employment with a government agency and paid sick leave are among the most important observable job characteristics. However the R 2 of 0.08 in this regression suggests that many determinants of job choice are not observed in the NLSY79. In the seemingly likely case that determinants of job choice are not observed in any data set, treating non-wage utility as a latent variable may be broadly appropriate.
Given the demonstrated value workers place on non-wage characteristics, accounting for these characteristics may also allow a more complete analysis in other labor economics applications. Notes: UI impact is based on simulated re-employment characteristics with and without UI takeup.
The decomposition of value from each attribute is based on changes in the value function caused by changes in that job attribute while holding the other attributes constant. Notes: Fraction of total benets due to each margin is aggregated across dierent UI benet groups, though the relative importance of each margin varies little across groups. Let V be a function specifying the value to both workers and rms of entering a period with a match described by {y it , m ijt , d ijt , w ij,t−1 }. The wage oer and job acceptance strategies described in this paper dene worker and rm behavior as a function of V. These behaviors in turn imply specic values to the worker and rm from every set of match char- To show that changes in bidding have a continuous eect on value functions, I describe the two eects of changes in bidding strategy. A change in bidding strategy causes continuous changes in equilibrium wages as well and discrete changes in a worker's choice between matches. Continuous changes in wages cause continuous changes in the value of a match to both workers and rms. Changes in choices between matches occur only where both the worker and rm are indierent between whether or not a worker accepts the oer from that 41 match. Thus neither wage changes nor choices between matches cause discontinuous changes in value functions, and f is continuous.
Because X is a non-empty convex set in a Banach space, K is a convex and compact subset of X and f(V ) maps K continuously into K, there is a xed point V * such that V * = f (V * )
by the Schauder xed point theorem.
